FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2005 
WWW.USDOJ.GOV          
AT
(202) 514-2007
TDD (202) 514-1888
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SUES NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS
FOR 
LIMITING COMPETITION AMONG REAL ESTATE BROKERS
NAR Policy Obstructs Internet-based Real Estate Brokers
from Offering Better Services
and Lower Costs to Consumers
WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division today filed a lawsuit against the National Association of Realtors
(NAR), challenging a policy that obstructs real estate brokers who use
innovative Internet-based tools to offer better services and lower costs to
consumers. The Department said that NAR's policy prevents consumers from
receiving the full benefits of competition and threatens to lock in outmoded
business models and discourage discounting.
The Department's civil antitrust lawsuit was filed today
in U.S. District Court in Chicago.
"The purchase of a home is one of the most
significant financial decisions a family can make, and NAR's policy stifles
competition to advantage some of its members at the expense of home buyers and
sellers across the country," said J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Department's Antitrust Division. "Consumers benefit
when real estate brokers are free to compete vigorously by offering innovative
services."
Although NAR today announced its adoption of a revised
policy, the revised policy continues to discriminate against innovative
brokers, and does not resolve the Department's concerns.
In most markets, real estate brokers share information
about properties for sale, known as listings, through the local Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) — a joint venture among competing brokers. Participation
in the local MLS makes it possible for a broker to provide customers with
listings for virtually all properties for sale in the community, which is
critical to compete in the local market, the Department said.
Traditionally, brokers provided listings for properties
to their customers in a variety of ways, such as by hand at their offices, or
by mail, fax, or e-mail. Some brokers have recently begun offering brokerage
services to their customers over the Internet, using so-called virtual office
websites, or VOWs. VOWs are password-protected Internet sites that allow the
broker's customers to search the MLS database on their own, using their home
computers to obtain the same information that would be available in a broker's
brick-and-mortar office. Delivering listings over the Internet gives web-savvy
consumers more control over their search for a home, allowing them to educate
themselves about their options at their own pace and on their own time. This
allows brokers to reduce the time that their agents spend searching the MLS
database or showing homes the customer dislikes, the Department said. Because
the Internet can be used to deliver brokerage services more efficiently —
resulting in better service and lower costs to consumers — brokers who utilize
the Internet represent a competitive challenge to traditional brokers, the
Department added.
In its complaint, the Department alleges that NAR's
policy restrains competition by requiring NAR-affiliated MLSs to adopt rules
that will allow brokers to withhold their clients' listings from other brokers'
websites by means of an "opt out." In essence, NAR's policy enables
traditional brokers to block their competitors' customers from having full
on-line access to all of the MLS's listings. When exercised, the opt-out
provision prevents web-based brokers from providing all MLS listings that
respond to a customer's search, effectively inhibiting the new technology, the
Department said.
NAR's policy significantly alters the rules that govern
MLSs by permitting traditional brokers to discriminate against other brokers
based on their business model, denying them the full benefits of MLS
participation. The Department's lawsuit seeks to ensure that traditional
brokers, through NAR's policy, cannot deprive consumers of the benefits that
would flow from these new ways of competing.
According to the Department's complaint, brokers who
participated in the NAR work group that formulated the VOW policy recognized
that the opt-out right would be "abused beyond belief." The chairman
of the working group admitted that the opt out right was likely to be exercised
by brokers despite the fact that "it may not be in the sellers' best
interest to opt out," the Department said in its filing.
NAR's policy denies brokers using new technologies and
business models the same benefits of MLS membership available to their
competitor brokers, suppresses innovation, discourages competition on price and
quality, and prevents new, efficient competitors from entering into the
marketplace — all to the detriment of consumers.
"The Department's Antitrust Division is committed to
preserving competition in this vital sector of our nation's economy,"
added McDonald.
The court will determine a pretrial schedule once NAR
files its response to the government's lawsuit. NAR is headquartered in
Chicago.
 
 
 I think this is worth printing again:
BE WARY OF DUAL AGENCY
With the growing number of very large and widespread brokerages, the issue of dual agency arises more frequently than ever before. Any purchaser, seller, lessor or lessee confronted with a dual agency issue by their real estate agent should not take the issue lightly. Parties to a real estate transaction, including real estate brokers and salespersons themselves, seldom realize the inherent problems of a real estate agent acting as a dual agent.
Dual agency arises when a real estate broker or salesperson represents adverse parties (e.g., a buyer and seller) in the same transaction.
Dual agency typically arises in the following way: a real estate broker employs two salespeople, one who works for the buyer as a buyer's agent and the other who works for the seller as a seller's agent. The real estate broker and his salespeople are "one and the same" entity when analyzing whether dual agency exists. As soon as the buyer's agent introduces the buyer to property in which the seller is represented by the seller's agent, dual agency arises.
Dual agency can also arise in a more subtle way: A real estate broker who represents the seller procures a prospective purchaser who needs to sell her property before she is able to buy the seller's property. The prospective purchaser then signs a listing agreement with the real estate broker to sell her property so that she can purchase the seller's property. The real estate broker is now a dual agent representing both parties in a mutually dependent transaction.
When you employ a real estate broker or salesperson as your agent, you are the principal. "The relationship of agent and principal is fiduciary in nature, ‘...founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.' (citation omitted) Included in the fundamental duties of such a fiduciary are good faith and undivided loyalty, and full and fair disclosure. Such duties are imposed upon real estate licensees by license law, rules and regulations, contract law, the principals of the law of agency, and tort law. (citation omitted) The object of these rigorous standards of performance is to secure fidelity from the agent to the principal and to insure the transaction of the business of the agency to the best advantage of the principal. (citations omitted)." (Emphasis added) DOS v. Moore, 2 DOS 99, p. 7 (1999)
"A real estate broker is strictly limited in his or her ability to act as a dual agent: As a fiduciary, a real estate broker is prohibited from serving as a dual agent representing parties with conflicting interests in the same transaction without the informed consent of the principals. (citations omitted) ‘If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance.' (citation omitted)
‘Therefore, a real estate agent must prove that prior to undertaking to act either as a dual agent or for an adverse interest, the agent made full and complete disclosure to all parties as a predicate for obtaining the consent of the principals to proceed in the undertaking. Both the rule and the affirmative [defense] of full disclosure are well settled in law.' (citation omitted)" Id. at pp. 9-10.
In a purchaser/seller transaction in which dual agency arises, the agent must not only clearly explain the existence of the dual agency issue and its implications to the parties, the agent must also obtain a written acknowledgment from the prospective purchaser and seller to dual agency. That acknowledgment requires each principal signing the form to confirm that they understand that the dual agent will be working for both the seller and buyer, that they understand that they may engage their own agent to act solely for them, that they understand that they are giving up their right to the agent's undivided loyalty, and that they have carefully considered the possible consequences of a dual agency relationship.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty that your real estate agent owes to you prohibits your agent from advancing any interests adverse to yours or conducting your business to benefit the agent or others.
Significantly, by consenting to dual agency, you are giving up your right to have your agent be loyal to you, since your agent is now also representing your adversary. Once you give up that duty of loyalty, the agent can advance interests adverse to yours. For example, once you agree to dual agency, you may need to be careful about what you say to your agent because, although your agent still cannot breach any confidences, your agent may not use the information you give him or her in a way that advances your interests.
As a principal in a real estate transaction, you should always know that you have the right to be represented by an agent who is loyal only to you throughout the entire transaction. Your agent's fiduciary duties to you need never be compromised.
I think this is worth printing again:
BE WARY OF DUAL AGENCY
With the growing number of very large and widespread brokerages, the issue of dual agency arises more frequently than ever before. Any purchaser, seller, lessor or lessee confronted with a dual agency issue by their real estate agent should not take the issue lightly. Parties to a real estate transaction, including real estate brokers and salespersons themselves, seldom realize the inherent problems of a real estate agent acting as a dual agent.
Dual agency arises when a real estate broker or salesperson represents adverse parties (e.g., a buyer and seller) in the same transaction.
Dual agency typically arises in the following way: a real estate broker employs two salespeople, one who works for the buyer as a buyer's agent and the other who works for the seller as a seller's agent. The real estate broker and his salespeople are "one and the same" entity when analyzing whether dual agency exists. As soon as the buyer's agent introduces the buyer to property in which the seller is represented by the seller's agent, dual agency arises.
Dual agency can also arise in a more subtle way: A real estate broker who represents the seller procures a prospective purchaser who needs to sell her property before she is able to buy the seller's property. The prospective purchaser then signs a listing agreement with the real estate broker to sell her property so that she can purchase the seller's property. The real estate broker is now a dual agent representing both parties in a mutually dependent transaction.
When you employ a real estate broker or salesperson as your agent, you are the principal. "The relationship of agent and principal is fiduciary in nature, ‘...founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.' (citation omitted) Included in the fundamental duties of such a fiduciary are good faith and undivided loyalty, and full and fair disclosure. Such duties are imposed upon real estate licensees by license law, rules and regulations, contract law, the principals of the law of agency, and tort law. (citation omitted) The object of these rigorous standards of performance is to secure fidelity from the agent to the principal and to insure the transaction of the business of the agency to the best advantage of the principal. (citations omitted)." (Emphasis added) DOS v. Moore, 2 DOS 99, p. 7 (1999)
"A real estate broker is strictly limited in his or her ability to act as a dual agent: As a fiduciary, a real estate broker is prohibited from serving as a dual agent representing parties with conflicting interests in the same transaction without the informed consent of the principals. (citations omitted) ‘If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance.' (citation omitted)
‘Therefore, a real estate agent must prove that prior to undertaking to act either as a dual agent or for an adverse interest, the agent made full and complete disclosure to all parties as a predicate for obtaining the consent of the principals to proceed in the undertaking. Both the rule and the affirmative [defense] of full disclosure are well settled in law.' (citation omitted)" Id. at pp. 9-10.
In a purchaser/seller transaction in which dual agency arises, the agent must not only clearly explain the existence of the dual agency issue and its implications to the parties, the agent must also obtain a written acknowledgment from the prospective purchaser and seller to dual agency. That acknowledgment requires each principal signing the form to confirm that they understand that the dual agent will be working for both the seller and buyer, that they understand that they may engage their own agent to act solely for them, that they understand that they are giving up their right to the agent's undivided loyalty, and that they have carefully considered the possible consequences of a dual agency relationship.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty that your real estate agent owes to you prohibits your agent from advancing any interests adverse to yours or conducting your business to benefit the agent or others.
Significantly, by consenting to dual agency, you are giving up your right to have your agent be loyal to you, since your agent is now also representing your adversary. Once you give up that duty of loyalty, the agent can advance interests adverse to yours. For example, once you agree to dual agency, you may need to be careful about what you say to your agent because, although your agent still cannot breach any confidences, your agent may not use the information you give him or her in a way that advances your interests.
As a principal in a real estate transaction, you should always know that you have the right to be represented by an agent who is loyal only to you throughout the entire transaction. Your agent's fiduciary duties to you need never be compromised.